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Abstract: Since the emergence of the virtual currency Bitcoin in 2009, a new, 
Internet-based way of recording entitlements and enforcing rights has increasingly 
captured the interest of businesses and governments. The technology is commonly 
called ‘blockchain’ and is often associated with a closely related phenomenon, the 
‘smart contract’. The market is now exploring ways of using these concepts for 
financial assets, such as securities, legal tender and derivative contracts. This article 
develops a conceptual framework for the governance of blockchain-based networks 
in financial markets. It constructs a vision of how financial regulation and private law 
should set the boundaries of this new technology in order to protect market 
participants and societies at large, while at the same time allowing for the necessary 
room for innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I will explore the regulatory and private law issues arising in relation to the use 
of blockchain networks in financial markets, including relevant issues of internal governance 
(hereafter referred to as governance). The analysis establishes whether and to what extent 
blockchain-based business models can exist outside the regulatory and supervisory perimeter 
that generally applies to financial institutions. It further investigates the role of private law 
within these networks, notably in ensuring the smooth functioning of risk-based regulation 
and in avoiding a risk-shift towards non-adjusting third parties. Lastly, the article assesses the 
need for cross-jurisdictional co-ordination. It is conceived as a mapping exercise, 
constructing a vision of the core governance issues and their interdependencies, thus 
providing the conceptual foundation for a future governance framework.  
The emergence of blockchain technology has become inextricably linked to Bitcoin,2 a 
‘virtual currency’ that allows users to trade ‘bitcoins’ directly from peer to peer without 
involving banks or other intermediaries.3 It has developed functions akin to those of money, 
in particular since it can be freely exchanged against legal tender.4 Bitcoin has risen to 
                                                
2 G.W. Peters and E. Panayi, ‘Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers through Blockchain Technologies: Future of 
Transaction Processing and Smart Contracts on the Internet of Money’, (Working Paper 18 Nov. 2015), 3 at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692487, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
3 The paper that laid the foundations for Bitcoin and the blockchain technology is S. Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-
Peer Electronic Cash System’ (Working Paper 2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf visited 30 Nov. 2016; for a 
comprehensive description Peters and Panayi, n 2, 2-9; for technical but still accessible description E. Wall and G. 
Malm, ‘Using Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts to Create a Distributed Securities Depository’ (Master 
Thesis Lund University 2016), 5-23 at 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8885750&fileOId=8885765 visited 30 Nov. 
2016. 
4 See C. Procter, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP, 7th ed, 2012), 1.170-1.172.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875487 
Draft working paper 16/12/2016 
3 
prominence as a means of payment (over 100,000 retailers accept bitcoins)5 and as a means 
of speculation6 beyond the circles of Internet aficionados in the space of just a few years. 
However, it has also gained notoriety as being susceptible to speculative bubbles, and as the 
object of criminal activity.7  
The easiest way to understand what blockchain technology stands for is to think of it 
as an Internet-based database to store entitlements, of which identical copies of equal 
constitutive value are held by every network participant. The database enables each 
participant to trade these entitlements by instructing the database software accordingly, 
which will then autonomously and irreversibly effect the relevant changes to the network 
participants’ holdings (in addition to ‘database’, the terms ‘ledger’ and ‘record’ are also used). 
This was the idea originally introduced with the Bitcoin network. Later on, blockchain 
networks emerged that were more flexible in terms of what could be recorded in the 
database, the most important of these probably being the Ethereum network, which also 
allows users to trade entitlements but which can, in addition, record and autonomously run 
self-executable programmes, the so-called ‘smart contracts’.8  
                                                
5 A. Cuthbertson, ‘Bitcoins now accepted by 100.000 retailers worldwide’ (International Business Times 4 February 
2015), at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-now-accepted-by-100000-merchants-worldwide-1486613, visited 30 Nov. 
2016. See also www.coindesk.com/information/what-can-you-buy-with-bitcoins/, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
6 See N. Mancini, ‘Bitcoin: Rischi e Difficoltà Normative’, (2016) Banca Impresa Società 35(1), 131-134; I. Kaminska, 
‘The Mt. Gox Bitcoin Bubble’ (Financial Times 4 August 2016), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/04/2136420/the-
mt-gox-bitcoin-bubble/, visited 30 Nov. 2016 
7 See Kaminska, ibid; K. Scannell, ‘Founder of Silk Road given Life in Prison’ (Financial Times 29 May 2015), at 
www.ft.com/content/8694f87c-0646-11e5-89c1-00144feabdc0, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
8 See https://ethereum.org, visited 30 Nov. 2016; K. Werbach, ‘Trustless Trust’ (Working Paper August 2016), 31 at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2844409, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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Meanwhile, the technology has been extended further to take in ‘real’ things,9 notably 
financial assets, ie those assets that, unlike virtual currencies, represent a claim against 
another party. With such technology, shares or bonds could be issued,10 traded and settled 
on the blockchain networks, thereby replacing stock exchanges, clearing houses and 
settlement systems.11 Indeed, the technology could be used to make all kinds of payment,12 
and central banks could issue legal tender in this way.13 Likewise, derivative contracts could 
                                                
9 For instance diamonds (http://www.everledger.io), government services in Estonia ranging from healthcare to 
electronic court procedures (https//e-estonia.com/component), visited 30 Nov. 2016), crowdfunding applications (see 
A. Sunnarborg, ‘Blockchain Startups Make Up 20% of Largest Crowdfunding Projects’ [Venturebeat 15 May 2016], 
http://venturebeat.com/2016/05/15/blockchain-startups-make-up-20-of-largest-crowdfunding-projects/, visited 30 
Nov. 2016), and music royalties (G. Howard, ‘Bitcoin for Rock stars – A Year Later’ [Forbes 25 September 2015], 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgehoward/2015/09/25/bitcoin-for-rock-stars-a-year-later-an-update-from-d-a-
wallach-on-blockchain-and-the-arts-part-1/#cd82c6522493, visited 30 Nov. 2016.). 
10 See G. Chavez-Dreyfuss, ‘Overstock to Issue Stock to be traded on Blockchain Platform’ (Reuters 16 March 2016), 
www.reuters.com/article/us-overstock-bitcoin-stocks-idUSKCN0WI2YA, visited 30 Nov. 2016; Nasdaq, ‘Nasdaq 
Linq enables first-ever private securities issuance documented with blockchain technology’ (Press release 30 December 
2015), http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=948326, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
11 See DTCC, ‘Embracing Disruption—Tapping the Potential of Distributed Ledgers to Improve the Post-Trade 
Landscape’ (January 2016), at www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/blockchain-white-paper, visited 30 Nov. 2016; 
Euroclear and Slaughter and May, ‘Blockchain Settlement—Regulation, Innovation and Application’ (November 
2016), at www.euroclear.com/en/campaigns/Blockchain-settlement-Regulation-innovation-and-application.html, 
visited 30 Nov. 2016; Euroclear and Oliver Wyman, ‘Blockchain in Capital Markets’ (February 2010), at 
www.euroclear.com/en/campaigns/blockchain-in-capital-markets.html, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
12 See, eg Ripple (Settlement of international wholesale payments) https://ripple.com; Circle (consumer payment 
services in EUR, USD, GBP) www.circle.com/en-gb.  
13 See B. Broadbent, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, ‘Central Banks and Digital Currencies’ (Speech at 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2 March 2016), at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/886.aspx, visited 30 Nov. 2016; J. Wild, ‘Central banks 
explore blockchain to create digital money’ (Financial Times 2 Nov. 2016), at www.ft.com/content/f15d3ab6-750d-
11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a, visited 30 Nov. 2016; A. Sharp, Bank of Canada to publish payment experiment result in 
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be concluded, administered and settled within blockchain networks.14 In this article, I refer 
to these and similar emerging structures (to the exclusion of virtual currencies) as ‘blockchain 
financial networks’. 
The financial industry has already spent over 1.4bn USD on research into 
blockchain15 as it is expecting immense benefits from moving to the new technology; banks 
are hoping to save 15-20bn USD on their infrastructure by 2022.16 At the same time, Fintech 
businesses are preparing to enter the financial market with innovative blockchain-based 
services,17 while regulators and legislators are considering how to accommodate the new 
technology.18 Yet however great the current interest in blockchain technology, its adoption is 
still in its early infancy and very much in flux. Potential applications range from the original, 
highly disruptive concept underlying Bitcoin or Ethereum, which involves open, largely 
anonymous, unregulated peer-to-peer networks that eliminate the need for financial 
                                                                                                                                      
coming months’ (Reuters 20 Nov. 2016), at www.reuters.com/article/canada-cenbank-blockchain-
idUSL1N1D31J5?feedType=RSS&feedName=bondsNews, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
14 See L. Brain, ‘Barclay’s Smart Contract Templates’ (video London 18 April 2016), at 
https://www.r3cev.com/projects/, visited 30 Nov. 2016; A. Karphal, ‘Barclay’s used blockchain technology to trade 
derivatives, (CNBC 19 April 2016), at www.cnbc.com/2016/04/19/barclays-used-blockchain-tech-to-trade-
derivatives.html, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
15 See World Economic Forum, ‘The future of Financial Infrastructure’ (August 2016), 14 at 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-future-of-financial-infrastructure-an-ambitious-look-at-how-blockchain-can-
reshape-financial-services/, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
16 See Santander, ‘Fintech 2.0—Rebooting Financial Services’ (June 2016), https://www.finextra.com/finextra-
downloads/newsdocs/the%20fintech%202%200%20paper.pdf, visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
17 See for examples n 12 and Clearmatics (securities and derivatives settlement) http://www.clearmatics.com; Epiphyte 
(foreign exchange settlement) http://epiphyte.com.  
18 See European Parliament, Resolution of 26 May 2016 on Virtual Currencies, Doc. No. P8_TA(2016)0228); Financial 
Conduct Authority (UK), ‘Financial Conduct Authority unveils successful sandbox firms on the second anniversary of 
Project Innovate’ (Press release, 7 Nov. 2016), at www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority-
unveils-successful-sandbox-firms-second-anniversary, visited on 30 Nov. 2016. 
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intermediaries, to rather unspectacular projects that use only certain parts of the blockchain 
technology, notably the distributed database, to modernise and harmonise IT infrastructure 
in a quest for greater efficiency without attempting to overthrow existing market structures.19  
The disruptive potential of blockchain technology applies not only to existing 
business models but also threatens the effectiveness of the existing governance framework 
for financial markets, depending on how the technology is deployed. It is important, 
therefore, to set the axioms of a governance framework for blockchain financial networks at 
an early stage in order to further a potentially beneficial market development and avoid the 
cost of adjusting market practice to new rules at a later stage.20  
My starting point in the second part of this article will be an analysis of the three 
ground-breaking characteristics of blockchain networks (ie, distributed ledgers, the 
immutability of the acquisition process and the record, and the possible storage of auto-
executable smart contracts in a blockchain database) that could effect structural changes in 
market practice and may render traditional governance concepts ineffective. 
The third part of this article contemplates the characteristics of blockchain 
technology in the light of existing financial regulation. Originally, blockchain technology was 
conceived for state-remote networks, ie networks entirely self-governed on the basis of 
consensus amongst their users. Nevertheless, blockchain financial networks may create risks 
that might have an impact on the wider market, notably by transmitting systemic risk, 
discriminating between market actors and facilitating illegal activity. Hence, blockchain 
financial networks cannot remain outside the regulatory perimeter. 
The fourth part of this article looks at private law and the treatment of individual 
rights in blockchain financial networks. Here, crucially, software may be seen as the sole 
                                                
19 See n 11. 
20 See A. Wright and P. De Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ (Working 
Paper 12 March 2015), 56 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664, visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
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determinant for enforceability, thus bypassing the relevant rules of private law and the 
authority of the courts. Such a strict technology-based solution in balancing diverging 
interests may be acceptable if confined to the actual parties to a blockchain-based 
transaction. However, third parties and the market at large may also be affected, so that the 
issue of enforceability of rights cannot be left entirely to the software. 
The fourth part of the article discusses two factors that are instrumental in shaping 
regulatory and legislative strategies appropriate for a range of future applications of 
blockchain technology to financial transactions. The first such factor is the extent to which 
regulated financial institutions are involved in blockchain networks; if they are, much of the 
existing regulation can be applied. An equally important issue is the international reach of 
blockchain financial networks, which may render domestic governance frameworks largely 
ineffective, unless there is appropriate international co-ordination.  
The final part of the article sets out my conclusions.  
A NEW MARKET PRACTICE AND THE  
TRADITIONAL LINCHPINS OF GOVERNANCE 
Blockchain came to be counted among the ‘disruptive’ technologies very early on, ie, it was 
spotted as one of those typically Internet-based platforms that have the potential of 
unravelling traditional market structures, as has happened in other areas such as transport by 
taxi (Uber), holiday accommodation (Airbnb) and telecommunications (WhatsApp). Typically, 
disruptive technologies may modify the value chain of a traditional business, thereby 
threatening the incumbents’ income models.  
Blockchain technology enables disrupters and incumbents to reconceptualise 
business models in financial markets. As a result, existing ways of trading and administering 
financial assets might change considerably were blockchain technology to be adopted on a 
wider scale. However, the resulting changes will affect a number of aspects that today serve 
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as linchpins linking regulation and private law to market practice. These elements are deeply 
anchored in our understanding of how financial markets work and how we govern them. If 
they disappear or change, governance strategies will need to be adapted accordingly. 
Three characteristics of blockchain technology have the potential of turning our 
understanding of how the market functions upside down, and affect the current governance 
framework accordingly. First, the concept of the distributed ledger that lies at the heart of 
blockchain affects the central role of intermediation and client accounts or, more broadly, 
intermediary-client relationships; secondly, fail-proof, automated acquisition processes and 
immutable records replace trust in intermediaries and create a truth outside the authority of 
courts and supervisors; and lastly, blockchain technology renders the execution of smart 
contracts truly unstoppable, thereby excising all human discretion and judicial authority from 
the execution and enforcement of contractual duties. 
Distributed databases, disintermediation and the disappearance of client accounts 
Financial transactions, such as the payment of money, the sale and purchase of securities, the 
exchange of currencies or derivative contracts, in principle represent a bilateral relationship 
between the relevant parties. However, they are typically concluded, administered or settled 
using intermediaries such as banks or brokers, and financial market infrastructures such as 
stock exchanges, payment systems, securities settlement systems or derivatives central 
counterparties. Intermediaries and infrastructures form networks that link financial market 
actors with one another. These networks are traditionally ordered either in a centralised or a 
decentralised fashion.  
Centralised networks rely on a single record in which all transactions and holdings are 
recorded by a trusted central entity; only thus can market participants reach consensus on 
relevant facts, in particular their holdings.21 In several countries, for instance, a central 
                                                
21 ibid, 5. 
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securities depository maintains securities accounts for all market participants that invest in 
securities. All acquisitions and dispositions are recorded in that register, and each individual 
balance is retrievable there.22 Decentralised networks, on the other hand, are characterised by a 
structure in which different records together provide complete information on transactions 
and holdings. No single record on its own holds that comprehensive information. For 
instance, in some jurisdictions the central securities depository records the transactions and 
holdings of banks and brokers but not of end-investors. The assumption is that these banks 
and brokers will record the identity of investors to whom the securities ultimately belong in 
their own ledgers.23 
Different as they may be, the centralised and decentralised financial network models 
do share an important feature: the original two-party relationship between the parties to a 
transaction (seller-buyer) is replaced by several two-party relationships between the parties 
and their intermediaries and, as the case might be, between additional intermediaries 
providing the necessary links in the network. 24 The technical process of recording an 
entitlement to an asset takes place on the IT system of the relevant intermediary. This record 
is associated with the legal relationship between the intermediary and its client, generally 
called an account or, more broadly, the client relationship. In modern financial markets, this 
account or client relationship is one of the linchpins of financial regulation and private law: 
property rights are defined by and contractual duties arise from it, as do a plethora of 
behavioural rules set by financial regulation.  
By contrast, blockchain technology is based on the idea of a distributed record. Here, 
each participant in the network (‘node’), in practice a computer server controlled by a market 
                                                
22 See Unidroit, ‘Working Paper regarding so-called Transparent Systems’ (2006 Unidroit S78-44), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2006/study78/s-78-044-e.pdf, visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
23 See P. Paech, ‘Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain—An Inevitable Choice between Liquidity and Legal 
Certainty’, (2016) Uniform Law Review 21(4), 8-10. 
24 ibid, 15-16. 
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participant and fitted with the relevant blockchain platform software, maintains a complete 
record of past transactions. All nodes are constantly updated with information on the latest 
transactions. As a consequence, all transaction information is available at any node at any 
given point in time (and, hence, blockchain networks are not necessarily anonymous).25  
Obviously, the logic of blockchain financial networks in terms of record-keeping is 
very different from that underlying present market practice, which is based on either the 
centralised or the decentralised model for maintaining entitlement records. The information 
provided by all nodes is identical and has equal constitutive value, ie there are no master and 
subordinated records. Thus, blockchain introduces an organising principle into the financial 
markets that is not built on a two-party relationship between investors and intermediaries 
and between intermediaries and infrastructures.26 There are no intermediaries, hence no 
accounts or other intermediary-client relationships within the blockchain network, so that an 
important linchpin of financial regulation and private law concepts is missing. However, 
intermediation may still occur outside the network. Nodes may have clients, in which case 
they may also transact on the network in their own name but on behalf of these clients, ie 
operate as intermediaries for persons outside the network.27 
This ‘disintermediation’ within the network has enormous potential for change, both 
economically and legally. In order to understand it we must consider the current ecosystem 
of financial holdings and transactions. Financial intermediaries and infrastructures are only 
rarely involved in moving tangible assets around. Banks hold book-money in electronic 
accounts and transfer it through electronic payment systems. Similarly, shares, bonds and 
                                                
25 Nakamoto, n 3, section 5; P. De Filippi and B Loveluck, ‘The invisible Politics of Bitcoin: Governance crisis of a 
decentralised Infrastructure’, 5(3) Internet Policy Review (2016), 7-8 at 
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/invisible-politics-bitcoin-governance-crisis-decentralised-infrastructure, 
visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
26 Wright and De Filippi, n 20, 2. 
27 See below [000]. 
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derivatives are typically incorporeal and purely account-based. In fact, the lion’s share of the 
services provided by the financial service industry relates to data storage and data processing.  
However, the relevant IT systems they use differ considerably: as between different 
types of asset, different types of service provided in relation to an asset, different 
jurisdictions and even as between individual financial institutions. The same asset is typically 
mirrored repeatedly in different systems maintained by different entities, potentially in 
different jurisdictions. This historically generated multiplication and diversification of records 
and account relationships leaves ample room for inefficiencies and operational and legal 
risk:28 the constant reconciliation of these records is costly and slow; there are frequent 
temporary mismatches; investors are increasingly disconnected from issuers because the 
relevant investor rights are degraded down to the smallest feature common to all accounts 
used to hold a specific security;29 extracting aggregate data, for example for supervisory 
purposes, is a cumbersome exercise that often results in unsatisfactory results;30 as a given 
asset appears in different independent records it may be unclear which record is constitutive 
and which is only for book-keeping purposes; or, for the same reason, an asset may be used 
simultaneously by different parties, eg it might be pledged by different market participants 
for their own purposes, simply because the same asset appears in various accounts.31  
In the case of distributed records used in blockchain networks, all parties involved in 
holding and administering an asset have an up-to date copy of the same record at their 
disposal at all times, a record that is so designed as to exclude mismatches with the other 
                                                
28 Paech, n 23, 15-22. 
29 See E. Micheler, ‘Custody Chains and Asset Values: why crypto-securities are worth contemplating’ (2015) 
Cambridge Law Journal 74(3), 509-519. 
30 See Euroclear and Oliver Wyman, n 11, 7. 
31 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 22-23 for an overview of the various ledgers held within a financial institution for 
accounting and regulatory purposes. 
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copies.32 In addition, blockchain technology allows for greater data depth. That is, records 
are able to store more complex information than accounts typically can today.33 For instance, 
a traditional securities account with a broker records ownership of securities but nothing 
else. More in-depth information in relation to these securities needs to be generated and held 
in separate records. In a future blockchain-based setting, information as to ownership of a 
specific share could extend to information as to which service providers are involved in its 
administration, whether the share is encumbered and if so, in whose favour. In addition, self-
executing programmes, so-called ‘smart contracts’ (which I will discuss below), can be 
recorded together with the ownership information and could, for instance, automatically 
process dividend or interest payments once they are due.  
In other words, the industry could move from a multitude of records relating to the 
same asset and maintained for different purposes, and which are not properly co-ordinated, 
to a single record34 distributed amongst and used by all parties, or at least significantly reduce 
the number of different records. Because the blockchain record is distributed amongst all 
nodes, the relevant financial institutions and infrastructures are able to provide their services 
in relation to a specific asset on the basis of the same information. Significant parts of the 
financial industry, including most ‘global players’, have identified these benefits as their 
common interest and have formed consortia supporting technology start-ups, such as the 
R3CEV and Hyperledger, that are currently developing the relevant blockchain software.35  
As a consequence, the considerable operational complications caused by multiple 
records could be removed in the future, as would be the associated uncertainty and cost. The 
                                                
32 See Nakamoto, n 3, 3-4; Wall and Malmo, n 3, 8-16. 
33 P. Ortolani, ‘Self-enforcing Online Dispute Resolution: Lessons from Bitcoin’ (2016) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 36(3), 595, 608.  
34 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 24. 
35 See https://www.r3cev.com and https://www.hyperledger.org, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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speed of settling transactions would increase.36 At the same time, reporting to the competent 
supervisor would be facilitated, as the relevant data could be made available by giving the 
supervisor access to the blockchain record. 37  
A fail-proof system, the displacement of trust and the redefinition of truth  
A distributed record as described above is only the base component of a blockchain 
network. In particular, additional mechanisms are needed to guarantee that the updates of 
records kept by nodes reflect the truth, since practically any node would be in a position to 
propose updates to the other nodes, including fraudulent ones.  
 Traditionally, the truthfulness of records in financial markets is ensured through a 
mechanism involving trust (in the everyday sense of the word38) and responsibility. Clients 
trust their intermediaries to keep records diligently so that they reflect the true state of 
holdings at any given time. Reputation may be the original bedrock of this trust, but more 
importantly today it is a question of regulation: clients typically trust financial institutions 
because they know they are authorised and supervised.39 Clients expect intermediaries to be 
able to correct erroneous records, and to do so either voluntarily or compelled by the 
judiciary.40 In other words, regardless of the outcome of the technical process of record 
keeping, intermediaries and, ultimately, the courts have the last word as to whether rights 
such as securities or cash in accounts have been acquired or lost and, hence, whether the 
relevant record entries correspond to the truth.  
                                                
36 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 17, 27. 
37 See ibid, 18. 
38 Though this ‘is one of those “I know it when I see it”’, Werbach, n 8, 8, see for a discussion of ‘trust’ ibid, 8-15. 
39 See ibid, 15-16.  
40 Ortolani, n 33, 607. 
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By contrast, the inventors of blockchain relinquished the current model for ensuring 
truthful outcomes built on ex-ante regulation-induced trust and ex-post review by the courts.41 
Instead, blockchain technology relies entirely on a technology-based solution giving nodes 
the certainty that transactions are correctly executed and accurately recorded. In addition to 
the idea of a distributed record (see preceding section), the concepts builds, first, on a 
process to establish consensus amongst nodes regarding the correctness of an update of a 
record on the basis of a mathematical-probabilistic approach (this process is called the ‘proof 
of work’ in the Bitcoin context) and, secondly, on a process by which all processed 
transactions are locked in a chain of sequential, logically intertwined sets, or ‘blocks’, that 
cannot be changed once a new block of transactions has been validated by the nodes (this 
latter feature is the origin of the term ‘blockchain’).42  
For such a system to work, however, it is imperative that no person or group be in a 
position to take control of the majority of nodes and thus of the validating process. This goal 
is achieved by conceiving the network as ‘permission-less’,43 ie, as an open network. Anyone 
with the necessary (freely available) hardware and software can join Bitcoin, Etherium and 
other networks as a node following this strict logic. Even though this openness may allow 
fraudsters to join, the idea is that the well-nigh unlimited reservoir of computing power 
spread across the globe can theoretically be made available to the network and will always be 
greater than the computing power of a potential attacker, thus rendering the network 
tamper-proof and censorship-resistant.44 Newer blockchain networks, in particular those set 
up amongst financial institutions, depart from this logic and restrict access to their networks, 
                                                
41 Nakamoto, n 3, 1; M. Raskin, ‘The Law of Smart Contracts’ (Working Paper 22 September 2016), 7 at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2842258, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
42 See Nakamoto, n 3, 1-4; Wall and Malm, n 3, 5-23.  
43 Nakamoto, n 3, 8. 
44 Nakamoto, n 3, 3; Wall and Malm, n 3, 7; for a critical assessment see De Filippi and Loveluck, n 25, 14-17. 
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for instance to members in a specific consortium.45 However, this is possible only because 
these networks imply some level of trust amongst nodes.46 Hence, the ‘permissioned’ model 
of blockchain networks is different not only in that it requires permission to access. In actual 
fact, these networks are based on fundamental assumptions different from those of the 
original blockchain technology.47  
Smart contracts and unstoppable execution 
The term ‘smart contract’ refers to computer code that is designed automatically to execute 
contractual duties upon the occurrence of a trigger event.48 The simple example of a vending 
machine has been cited to explain the concept: upon insertion of a specific type of coin, the 
computer programme instructs the mechanism of the machine to release the good.49 This 
concept was not originally part of the blockchain idea. It might be described as an add-on 
extending the capabilities of the blockchain network beyond its function as a keeper of 
records.  
A smart contract ‘excises human discretion from contract execution’.50 Unlike the 
performance of contracts generally, performance on a smart contract cannot be stopped, 
neither voluntarily by the parties (ie it can neither be breached nor amended), nor by a 
                                                
45 Peters and Panayi, n 2, 6. 
46 ibid. 
47 See ibid, 7. 
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central entity, nor by a court or supervisor.51 The near-absolute certainty of performance 
makes contracting much more efficient as the counterparty risk and settlement risk typically 
inherent in contracts are considerably reduced, if not eliminated. A simple example is the 
securities collateral kept in a blockchain network: if the debtor has not paid by a certain date, 
the smart contract autonomously transfers the securities to the creditor. Furthermore, the 
precision of the programming language is much greater than that of written human language; 
in particular, warranties and conditions can be formulated with much greater accuracy,52 and 
contracts can be treated and processed in data formats.53 Hence, it is argued, smart contracts 
make transacting considerably less expensive owing to certainty of execution and the near-
zero risk of litigation in court.54 
In the financial markets, smart contracts could be used for a variety of functions. For 
instance, a bond held in a blockchain network might have a smart contract attached to it that 
automatically executes interest payments on the payment date, and the amount to be paid is 
determined on the basis of data retrieved from a predefined, reliable Internet source. A 
second example relates to the derivatives market.55 Parties might enter derivative contracts 
electronically; the relevant building blocks of that short programme would automatically be 
taken and assembled from an electronic contract library set up to this effect. The smart 
contract could be so designed as to automatically cater for due payments to be executed and 
to adjust collateral levels between the parties. Also, upon termination of the contract, the 
programme could autonomously calculate the due termination amount to be paid. Again, 
amounts would depend on reference data sourced from a predefined, reliable data provider.  
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Interestingly, the (older) concept of smart contracts will achieve its full potential only 
if combined with the (newer) invention of blockchain networks.56 This is because the 
certainty of execution is not absolute as long as human discretion can interfere with the 
process: the vending machine is technically still under the control of its owner. In the context 
of financial markets, the issue is that IT systems, for example those running cash and 
securities accounts, are still controlled by a financial intermediary who can alter the process, 
either voluntarily or in compliance with a court or supervisory order. By contrast, the record 
of a blockchain network on which a smart contract is stored is supposed to be absolutely 
immutable and its execution automatic. As set out in the previous section, autonomy of 
execution is a direct consequence of the fact that blockchain networks operate without any 
central or trusted entity to balance the parties’ interests.57 In other words, it is only in 
blockchain networks that there is truly no ex post review of contractual duties after contract 
formation.58  
Smart contracts can theoretically be combined and thus interact with one another in 
a decentralised and distributed structure, operating autonomously, ie without human 
intervention, once deployed by their programmers on the basis of the rules and mechanisms 
programmed into them.59 Such ‘decentralised autonomous organisations’ (DAOs) could even 
enter into new smart contracts with other market actors, creating a complex, evolving 
ecosystem of interacting agents linked by pre-determined, hard-wired and self-enforcing 
rules.60 They are not owned or controlled by any single person or corporation; yet they can 
interact with the market.61  
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The most important DAO so far was created on the basis of smart contracts 
recorded and processed on the Ethereum network: ‘A humanless venture capital firm that 
would allow the investors to make all the decisions through smart contracts. There would be 
no leaders, no authorities. Only rules coded by humans, and executed by computer 
protocols.’62 It raised a spectacular 150m USD of which 50m were subsequently diverted by 
a malicious node to a private Internet address, leading to the project being abandoned.63 Still, 
similar projects may emerge in the future despite this failure. By contrast, it is not yet clear 
whether and to what extent the financial industry will develop an interest in such entirely 
autonomous, self-referential actors since, as for-profit organisations, they ultimately need to 
keep legal and economic ties with the device and exercise some control over it. In any case, 
the somewhat extreme concept of totally autonomous self-executing software shows that 
smart contracts stored on a blockchain network can operate in varying degrees of autonomy 
from humans and on a smaller or larger scale, providing input to one another in the form of 
reference data and triggering events, potentially across different blockchain networks. 
Obviously, the more intertwined smart contracts become and the lower the degree of control 
by humans, the more difficult it will be to govern this phenomenon.  
BLOCKCHAIN FINANCIAL NETWORKS AND STATE REGULATION 
The inventors of blockchain technology aimed at creating self-governing and state-remote 
networks, as epitomised by Bitcoin. Nobody should be able to interfere in the governance of 
the network from outside the circle of its nodes: in particular, States should be unable to 
censor or regulate it. Instead, internal processes are deemed to balance all the relevant 
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interests so that no judicial or regulatory intervention is needed. 64  Nevertheless, since 
blockchain-based virtual currencies provide individuals with a means of payment and an easy 
and near-anonymous method of transferring value, States are considering relevant regulation, 
mainly targeting money laundering and terrorist financing. 65  Beyond this very specific 
rationale, the role of blockchain financial networks in which securities, legal tender and 
derivatives are held could become so relevant in the future that societies will need to regulate 
and supervise them more consistently. 
Effective regulation requires a suitable addressee against which the rules can be 
enforced. In the case of virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, it appears difficult or well-nigh 
impossible effectively to regulate the person or persons controlling the software (which I 
here call the ‘software platform provider’) as they are typically informally associated 
individuals that may be scattered around different jurisdictions.66 Regulators could therefore 
attempt to regulate these networks by forcing local Internet providers to block the relevant 
data traffic.67 However, this approach is only partly effective and politically and legally 
difficult to justify in a democratic setting as long as equally efficient, less intrusive means are 
at the regulators’ disposal. Against this background, regulatory initiatives at present target the 
intermediaries at the intersection between the virtual currency and the financial market, in 
particular the so-called virtual currency exchanges, ie those entities exchanging legal tender 
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for virtual currency.68 Regulators could take the same approach in relation to blockchain 
financial networks on which securities, legal tender and derivatives are held and transferred. 
However, it is moot whether this approach would suffice, in particular as there might be 
risks in this context that can only be addressed for a blockchain financial network as a whole. 
This structural aspect will be touched upon in the following subsections but will only be fully 
addressed in part five of this article, after the various material risks have been discussed. 
Hence, the main focus of the sections that follow will be on the material scope of 
regulation. As soon as financial assets such as legal tender, securities or derivatives are held 
and transferred through blockchain financial networks, the regulatory perimeter will need to 
extend to many more areas than just money laundering. This is due, first of all, to 
considerations of (market) scale: for the time being, transaction volumes in virtual currencies 
are tiny compared to those in financial assets. 69  Then there is the question of 
interconnectedness: as soon as blockchain financial networks are used for financial assets, 
their potential negative externalities will immediately transmit to the traditional banking and 
financial sectors, as banks and other financial institutions will become involved in these 
networks. Also, the connection to the real economy would become much more immediate 
since, unlike virtual currencies, financial assets embody claims against corporate and State 
debtors.   
I will analyse the following issues in turn. First, blockchain financial networks may 
influence the stability of financial markets. Secondly, self-governance within a network may 
cause distortions that lead to discrimination against parties that are unable to adjust their 
behaviour. Thirdly, the possibility of transferring financial assets on blockchain networks 
may render anti-money-laundering measures and similar rules largely ineffective.  
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Resilience and financial stability 
Blockchain financial networks, like traditional market infrastructures such as clearing and 
settlement systems or central counterparties, could become systemically important in the 
future. Their function in the market places them among these critical infrastructures. 
Blockchain financial networks would provide a service that would not be easy to replace 
should they fail to function properly, as they would provide for the constitutive records of 
financial asset holdings, act as a repository for a variety of important data and as the platform 
on which smart-contract-based derivatives are executed.70 As networks linking a multitude of 
financial market actors, potentially of different types, they are also highly interconnected.71 
For all these reasons, such networks are destined to become important in terms of financial 
stability once they have attracted a certain volume of assets and a critical number of users. It 
might therefore be necessary to regulate blockchain financial networks in order to ensure 
that they are resilient and do not contribute to systemic risk but, ideally, help to reduce it. 
There are a number of relevant aspects which I will address in turn below. 
Operational soundness and software loopholes  
The first concern is about the operational soundness and continuity of the relevant 
processes. Uncertainty as to the accuracy or availability of records or the correct execution of 
smart contracts could have significant repercussions for financial stability.72 The relevant 
hardware, ie the node-servers, and the individuals operating it are ‘distributed’ throughout 
the network, independent from each other and not centrally controlled – hence any concerns 
regarding integrity, availability, continuity, safety and accuracy relate to the software 
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platform. Given its crucial importance for the nodes and their clients and for the market as a 
whole, there is a need for relevant regulation.73 
However, this issue extends far beyond the operational functioning of the network. 
A matter of equal importance is that the processing of transactions and the execution of 
smart contracts must result in the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ outcome. What is correct or true is not 
defined objectively according to absolute criteria obtained outside the network. Rather, the 
yardstick is consensus among nodes on how transactions should be processed and records 
kept. This consensus is typically established when nodes join the network and thereby adhere 
to the rules determining the acquisition and disposition of assets and the execution of smart 
contracts on the network (hereafter referred to as ‘internal rules’). These rules are laid down 
directly in the form of a computer code; there are no ‘bylaws’ or similar documents in human 
language.74 The internal rules may also be changed following the relevant internal governance 
procedures.75  
However, there is significant room for trouble. The software programming and user 
expectations may diverge, either because an unintended loophole has been created due to the 
sheer complexity of the software platform (as was the case with the Ethereum-DAO 50m 
USD ‘theft’, which did not, technically speaking, occur because of an illegal intrusion into the 
software but as a result of the exploitation of a previously undetected loophole in the 
software),76 or of a programming error (‘bug’).77 Ex ante regulatory measures to avoid such 
loopholes or bugs are important, also to ensure the transparency of the internal rules.78 
However, loopholes and bugs can never be entirely avoided and they might affect all or 
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significant parts of the assets held in the network. Therefore, systemic stability requires that 
‘incorrect’ results in a blockchain financial network be prevented before they materialise or 
that there is at least a possibility to reverse such results. The programmers of Ethereum, to 
the surprise of many, were able to ‘reset’ past transactions and undo the abusive transfers.79 
This approach obviously contradicts the original concept of immutable outcomes of 
blockchain-based transactions; however, as Ethereum has shown, it is necessary to protect the 
market at large from becoming hostage to a programming bug or loophole. 
Risk management 
In any case, independently from the question of whether a blockchain financial network 
provides for the correct outcomes, it can contribute to systemic risk. Blockchain networks 
record the assets of their users. These assets are part of a highly complex risk management 
process in which every significant financial market participant is constantly engaged. Risk 
management is a central, integral part of capital requirements regulation, and hence a 
centrepiece of the framework that governs financial markets.80  
The main mechanisms used to mitigate risk are delivery-versus-payment, security or 
collateral, set-off, closeout netting and multilateral clearing of exposures. In addition, 
financial institutions hedge their market risks using derivatives such as interest rate swaps.81 
In principle, all these mechanisms could be programmed into the functionality of a 
blockchain financial network as smart contracts. However, in practice the technical hurdles 
are immense.  
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The key difficulty is that risk mitigation spans different classes of asset: for instance, 
a simple delivery-versus-payment mechanism keeps a performance (eg a transfer of 
securities) on hold until the other party has likewise performed its part (ie made the 
corresponding cash payment), in order to release both at the same time, thereby eliminating 
the settlement risk. However, to do so requires both the securities leg and the cash leg of the 
transaction to occur in the same blockchain financial network, on pains of not being able to 
enforce the necessary interdependency with any certainty. Alternatively, if securities and cash 
were held in two different networks, both networks would need to be linked in operational 
terms.82  
The risk management of a financial institution is a highly complex thicket typically 
managed with the assistance of computer algorithms. Cash, securities, claims and derivatives 
are all inextricably connected through the mechanisms mentioned above, ie delivery-versus-
payment, security, collateral, closeout netting, clearing and hedging. Therefore, modern risk 
management requires all these asset types and mechanisms to be available in a single 
network. Such a universal network would obviously raise questions of systemic risk in itself. 
The alternative to such a ‘leviathan’83 would be to have several networks where different 
asset types could be perfectly and unalterably linked through these risk mitigation 
functions—however, the resulting set-up would probably be extremely complex, requiring a 
high degree of standardisation and interoperability so that ultimately such a meta-network of 
blockchain financial networks would resemble the current situation in terms of complexity 
and proneness to error.  
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Herding, flash crashes and supervisory stays 
The unstoppable execution of transactions and smart contracts in blockchain financial 
networks might also have effects akin to systemic dangers provoked by the phenomena of 
‘herding’ or ‘flash crash’. The term ‘herding’ describes the synchronised behaviour of 
significant parts of the market as a reaction to certain market events. For instance, all hedge 
funds active in a given market segment may sell assets in the event of a sharply falling 
market, thereby amplifying the offending price movement. In extreme cases, herding may be 
one of the causes of so-called flash crashes, where extreme devaluation of an asset occurs in 
a very short period of time without any change in the underlying economic parameters. This 
phenomenon is typically due to identical behavioural patterns of the decision-makers or, 
where investment or risk mitigation decisions are outsourced to machines, to the use of 
algorithms that produce identical outcomes.84  
The autonomous and unstoppable execution of transactions and smart contracts in 
blockchain financial networks may aggravate this phenomenon. Removing the human 
element entirely eliminates the last vestiges of inertia and elasticity in the behaviour of 
financial market participants. This may be advantageous from a market efficiency point of 
view in good times, but may also amplify market distortions in times of crisis.85 Blockchain 
technology takes the ‘immediateness’ of market reactions to an extreme and may combine it 
with a high degree of interdependency of the various processes involved. This could, in 
addition, cause unwanted feedback loops, especially in relation to the operation of smart 
contracts that execute autonomously on the basis of market data automatically retrieved 
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from data sources.86 As a result, a single significant change in the market may immediately 
trigger another strong market move, which may in turn set off a third one, and so on. Hence, 
there is a need to assess blockchain financial networks and the potential of smart contracts in 
the light of rules addressing flash crashes and algorithmic trading.87 
 An additional issue is relevant in this respect: in order to be better prepared to 
prevent the occurrence of systemic risk caused by bank failures, recent legislation on bank 
resolution has equipped supervisors with the authority to halt the execution of certain 
contract terms, notably to prevent the termination of derivatives and repurchase agreements 
in the event of the imminent insolvency of a bank or investment firm (‘supervisory stay’).88 
Automatic, unstoppable execution of blockchain-based transactions would produce the exact 
opposite.89 In order to maintain the effectiveness of this supervisory tool, supervisors would 
need to be provided with an ‘emergency stop’ function, enabling them to halt the automatic 
termination of contracts recorded in a blockchain financial network. Such functionality 
would be part of the smart contract itself, making the stay dependent on data input triggered 
by the relevant regulatory decision.90 By contrast, it would not be possible to ‘reverse’ the 
termination afterwards. First, because the termination would wipe out many derivatives and 
repurchase agreements that were important for the relevant bank’s risk management and 
secondly, because it would be difficult to find counterparties prepared to offer new contracts 
to the near-insolvent party on economically viable terms. 
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Shadow banking risks and bubbles 
The emergence of blockchain financial networks and smart contracts may also influence the 
investment decisions made by market participants. Individuals or corporations may use the 
blockchain financial networks to store value, exchanging financial assets held with 
intermediaries for financial assets held in a blockchain network, in particular because of a 
perceived smaller risk, lower cost or better return as compared to more traditional ways of 
holding.91 As such, a blockchain financial network could also assume functions resembling 
those typically performed by banks, notably that of storing money.92 However, only the 
banks’ clients benefit from the relevant safety nets, such as deposit guarantees and access to 
central bank money for liquidity support. Blockchain financial network nodes do not benefit 
from these safety nets. If they act as intermediaries for clients outside the network, these 
clients are only protected if the node is a bank and the clients’ holdings are deposits or 
assimilated to deposits.93 The negative impact of adverse events on the market as a whole 
may be amplified by the fact that retail customers could withdraw their savings from the 
traditional banking sector, thereby diminishing their liquidity base.94 Both phenomena may 
cause risks comparable to those produced by so-called shadow banking. 
Taking this thought a step further, the use of blockchain technology and smart contracts 
may cause a false impression of zero credit risk, because smart contracts allow for the 
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immediate and autonomous enforcement of collateral should the obligor fail to perform. 
Collateral takers might assume that they are free to take on higher exposures, for example to 
lend more money, as there seems to be no risk of unenforceability of the collateral. 95 
However, this assumed certainty is risky in itself. Risk-takers will decrease their buffers in 
terms of reserves if they perceive a collateralised obligation to amount to zero risk. However, 
the uses of more efficient technology alone is poor justification for increased leverage in the 
financial system or, in other words, for stretching the liquidity cover of financial institutions 
even more thinly.96 
Internal governance and discrimination 
Bitcoin was originally conceived as a network comparable to a grassroots democracy. Its 
‘libertarian’, anti-institutional motivation sat very well with the concept of a permission-less 
network open to all, where all information was public but users were generally anonymous, 
and where trust and mistrust where not an issue because strong cryptography and fail-safe 
processes made trust redundant. However, Bitcoin could not possibly have remained aloof in 
the long run from the ideology and private interests of its stakeholders and was progressively 
compromised by the social and cultural context in which the technology operated.97 In 
particular, the validation of blocks and the associated creation (‘mining’) of new bitcoins has 
grown into a business that is today characterised by low margins and thus by a high degree of 
market concentration on a few very powerful players; as a consequence, there are a handful 
of Bitcoin mining entities or associations that effectively control the network and have a large 
say in its further development.98 Also, a group of elite IT specialists run the system from a 
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technical point of view, and these are effectively more influential than ordinary nodes given 
their superior knowledge and their role as gatekeepers between user consensus and computer 
code.99 As a consequence, Bitcoin has evolved into a highly centralised network, ruled by an 
increasingly oligopolistic market structure.100 
 The internal governance of Bitcoin is, however, different from the internal 
governance of future blockchain financial networks set up by for-profit organisations such as 
banks, other financial institutions or Fintech companies. These networks will be set up either 
in a spirit of mutuality, assisting market participants to pursue common interests (in 
particular higher efficiency),101 or as services provided to wholesale or retail customers. Still, 
once blockchain technology finds its way into financial assets and services, users may play 
different functional roles in the relevant networks, such as ‘passive’ nodes that do not 
contribute to the functioning of the network, or as ‘active’ nodes contributing resources such 
as computing power,102 giving them less or more formal or informal influence on the 
relevant governance decisions. Nodes will also be dissimilar on other grounds, for example 
because they generate higher or lower transaction volumes, because they join the network at 
an earlier or later point in time, because they have different nationalities or reside in different 
territories, or because they may or may not participate in markets outside that particular 
network and, if they do, have different roles and importance there, too.  
Very much as in any other type of network, these differences will influence the 
degree of bargaining power of the network nodes when it comes to the internal governance 
of the network. Mindful of the fact that financial institutions associated in blockchain 
financial networks, while they will have some interests in common, are nevertheless 
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competitors at various levels,103 bargaining power may be expected to be used to advance 
each node’s own economic goals by influencing the internal governance of the network, 
behaviour that may generate decisions detrimental to other, weaker, nodes. 
A blockchain financial network has several characteristics that are susceptible to 
discriminatory decision-making, thereby creating asymmetries within the network that could 
have a negative impact on the market as a whole. The most important such issue is that of 
actual access to a ‘permissioned’104 network, ie the possibility of excluding prospective new 
entrants or of only accepting them on unfair terms. Furthermore, processes and standards 
specific to the network, such as data formats or timelines, could be designed in such a way as 
to make it easier for some nodes to comply with them than for others. Also, the network 
could be designed so as to ensure that some nodes are able to extract more sensitive 
information about the dealings of their competitors than vice versa. Lastly, standards for 
reporting transaction data to supervisors could be set so as to make compliance with 
regulation easier for some nodes than for others. There may be other examples. 
Such a situation may be acceptable from the public policy point of view so long as 
blockchain-based networks in financial markets do not become dominant.105 However, once 
they do, these asymmetries can lead to competitive distortions.106 Weaker nodes may be 
unable to adjust their behaviour, in particular for lack of alternatives. In that scenario, 
blockchain networks would come conceptually close to infrastructures underpinning the 
financial market, ie they would become akin to exchanges, settlement or payment systems. 
Such infrastructures, however, are subject to neutrality requirements in providing their 
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services, even though they are currently for-profit organisations.107 Hence, comparable rules 
would need to apply in the future to blockchain financial networks, ie they should have 
objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, permitting fair and 
open access. 
Money laundering and other illegal activities 
Beyond the spectacular cases of illegal or illicit use of virtual currencies,108 concerns about 
money laundering and terrorist financing surfaced very early on, leading to relevant 
regulation in New York and intense debate in Europe and elsewhere.109 Two characteristics 
inherent in blockchain technology considerably facilitate illegal activity. The first, and most 
obvious, is the possibility of transacting with a higher degree of anonymity than is afforded 
by account-based transfers,110 with the instantaneous character of international transactions 
making it impossible to know who sends and who receives, for instance, a payment in 
bitcoins.111 Secondly, even if blockchain-based networks were not generally anonymous, 
there would be no-one on hand to perform the functions that lie at the core of anti-money-
laundering and related regimes.112 In the ‘real’ world, that burden is placed on intermediaries, 
in particular banks and other financial institutions.113 They are held liable for identifying the 
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parties to a transaction, including background due diligence extending to beneficial 
ownership of companies. They must report suspicious transactions to the competent 
authorities and in certain circumstances may be banned from executing such transactions.114  
In blockchain networks, intermediaries are not, in principle, needed.115 There is a 
need for intermediation only where such networks intersect with the market outside. In the 
case of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, users exchange virtual money for legal tender or 
vice versa through entities called exchanges.116 As the virtual currency blockchain networks 
themselves are difficult to regulate, to date the exchanges are the most suitable entry points 
for regimes such as anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing laws, 117 even 
though this approach would leave out any part of blockchain activity that did not involve an 
exchange of currency, such as, for example, activities where virtual currency is spent directly 
on goods and services.118 Still, this approach requires the recognition of virtual currency 
exchanges as regulated entities, which itself creates a whole new, publicly recognised sector 
within the financial market, raising further regulatory questions. Under the circumstances, no 
common strategy has emerged so far.119 There are no alternative ways of cracking down on 
illegal activity associated with state-remote networks by way of regulation. In particular, an 
outright ban seems to hold out scant promise as it is well-nigh impossible to enforce, except 
by blocking Internet traffic.120 In other words, although there certainly seems to be quite a 
problem, no suitable solution has as yet been found.  
                                                
114 See Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the 
Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing [etc], Articles 2, 4, 8 and 11. 
115 Rigsby, n 92, 38. 
116 See n 66-68.  
117 See n 109. 
118 Rigsby, n 92, 53. 
119 See n 68 and 91.  
120 Wright and De Filippi, n 20, 56. 
Draft working paper 16/12/2016 
33 
As to future processing and recording of financial assets, in particular legal tender 
and securities, in blockchain networks, there is no room for a wait-and-see approach 
comparable to that taken towards virtual currencies.121 Regulators would be sending the 
wrong signals and incentivising a move to the unregulated part of the market if new entrants 
were to be subject to no or more lenient—and therefore less costly—requirements purely on 
the ground that their business model was based on blockchain technology. 122  Hence, 
transfers of money and other assets through blockchain financial networks need to be 
subject to functionally equivalent rules preventing money laundering and other illegal 
activities. It will make less and less sense for regulation to address intermediaries at the 
intersection between the blockchain networks and the traditional financial market since, as 
financial assets are moved to blockchain networks, the role of such intermediaries is likely to 
decrease. In practice, individuals will be able to transfer legal tender and other assets directly 
through a blockchain network, requiring no intermediary, much in the same way as no 
intermediary is needed to pay for goods in a virtual currency.123 
We are currently witnessing the creation of blockchain-based payment or money 
remittance networks that are structurally comparable to virtual currencies. These networks 
would, however, transfer legal tender directly from sender to receiver. 124  Anti-money-
laundering regimes and similar rules require, first, the development of features enabling user 
authentication (the so-called ‘know-your-customer’ or KYC requirement).125 This is easier to 
achieve if these networks are ‘permissioned’, ie confined to admitted users.126 Secondly, it 
needs to be clear who is responsible for applying anti-money-laundering and similar rules. In 
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the absence of intermediaries, that task can only fall to those controlling the software, who 
therefore incur responsibilities akin to those of intermediaries in terms of managing access 
and handling regulatory matters, as discussed below in the part five.127 
AUTONOMOUS ALGORITHMS AND PRIVATE LAW 
One of the original traits at the basis of blockchain-based networks is that there is no trusted 
third person to effect and record transactions between nodes. In the world of blockchain, 
trust, which in the ‘real’ world is typically afforded to public authorities (such as the land 
register) or certain private parties (such as a bank or a notary), is replaced by reliance on 
software (see above, part two). For the nodes to be able to rely on their network’s software, 
they must be convinced of its soundness, ie they must be confident that it allocates rights 
according to internal rules to which they agreed upon joining the network (see above, [000]). 
At the same time, this principle entails that the process, once initiated, must be resistant to 
alteration and beyond human control. Otherwise, again, parties would need to trust the 
person controlling the process. As a logical consequence, the allocation of rights in 
blockchain financial networks must be unstoppable and irreversible.  
However, the idea of such unstoppable and irreversible allocation in practice of individual 
rights to users creates tensions with the private law framework. In the first subsection, I will 
discuss how the parties as well as the competent courts and regulators would lose authority 
over the enforceability of transactions or smart contracts once they were recorded on the 
blockchain. While the parties will themselves initially have agreed to this result, the second 
subsection will illustrate how their dealings may cause adverse externalities with regard to 
unrelated parties and the market as a whole, notably in respect of insolvency distribution and 
risk management. The authority to attribute rights in blockchain financial systems must 
therefore ultimately derive from the private law order, as explained in the third subsection.  
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The trust-less order and the loss of authority of the courts over transaction 
enforceability  
A key component of blockchain is that the process of disposition and acquisition of assets 
and the execution of smart contracts is determined solely by the internal rules128 of the 
blockchain network. The algorithms directly produce the relevant effects. In this process, the 
rules are constantly called upon to ‘decide’ whether or not a certain transfer will be executed 
or whether the right of a party arising under a smart contract will be automatically enforced. 
However, in taking this ‘decision’, the software typically overrides contravening interests of 
the other party, or potentially even of both parties. For instance, a smart derivatives contract 
might include a functionality causing it to terminate itself upon default of one party, 
automatically calculating and enforcing the amount still due from one party to the other, 
while at the same time transferring the associated collateral to the party that is ‘in the money’. 
This will contravene the interests of the defaulting party, in particular in cases where the 
default could have been easily rectified, for example where it was due to technical problems, 
adverse external circumstances or suchlike.  
A party may decide to go to court if it feels that its interests have been unduly 
overridden. However, the original blockchain logic does not sit well with the idea of judicial 
scrutiny, since the latter also entails acceptance of the idea that transactions can somehow be 
‘reversed’ and records be ‘corrected’. This would, however, be incompatible with the 
principle of immutability of the blockchain record and thus compromise the concept of the 
trust-less network.129 
Where transactions are near-anonymous, as they are in first-generation blockchain 
applications, the story typically ends here as there is no way de facto of suing the other party 
for damages in kind or in money. Even if the parties have previously agreed to an internal 
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dispute settlement mechanism (which does exist, for instance, for online acquisitions paid 
with bitcoins),130 this mechanism is built on the rules of the system, not on the rules of 
private law, and would again result in an outcome compatible with the logic of blockchain 
networks—ie validated transactions and the execution of smart contracts cannot be undone 
on the record.131  
In permissioned systems, where the identity of users is known,132 the party whose 
interest was overridden may consider going to court. However, court decisions do not exert 
the same authority as in the traditional context of financial market transactions. Should a 
party claim that a transaction or smart contract that was executed under the internal rules of 
the network was unenforceable in terms of private law, the hands of the court are tied to a 
large extent. First, the parties, using their contractual freedom, are likely to have agreed to the 
application of the internal rules to their dealings, superseding the relevant private law rules.133 
However, should the court hold that private law applies between the parties and that, on this 
basis, the transaction was unenforceable, it will still be unable to order a rectification of the 
blockchain, as the blockchain cannot be changed subsequently, even presupposing that there 
was a trusted entity controlling the network to whom the relevant court order could be 
addressed.134 What remains is the possibility to claim damages from the other party, in kind 
(ie the court may order the initiation of a reverse transaction) or in money. However, 
claiming damages will often frustrate the party whose interests were overridden, in particular 
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where the other party has become insolvent in the meantime or has transferred the relevant 
assets to a third person. 
This issue is also relevant in relation to smart contracts that are still open, where one 
of the parties claims that the contractual duties should be adapted in response to new 
circumstances not previously considered by the parties, ie in case of a lacuna.135 In the 
original blockchain setting, there is no way of changing the record, and thereby the 
contract,136 even in cases where both parties agree to the change. To revert to our earlier 
example: in the event of default in the context of a derivatives contract, the non-defaulting 
party too may often prefer not to terminate the contract and instead choose implicitly or 
expressly to adjust it, in particular by granting a grace period. Again, for lack of a trusted 
entity with the authority to change the record according to the parties’ agreement, the terms 
of the smart contract cannot be changed and its execution cannot be halted. A subsequent 
‘reversal’ of the situation, by entering into a new contract, will often not be possible as the 
circumstances may have changed in the meantime, in particular where one of the parties has 
become insolvent or where market conditions have undergone considerable change with 
time. 
Thus, any kind of ex post review is limited to the often unsatisfactory possibility of 
claiming damages in court. Here, blockchain-held assets differ markedly from assets held in 
more traditional, account-based structures. Current financial market infrastructures, such as 
clearing and settlement systems, also use computer programmes to prioritise their users’ 
interests on the basis of their internal rules, as described above.137 However, outcomes can 
still be changed by the infrastructure operator, honouring the agreement of the parties or 
court orders, or simply to correct operational failures.  
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Raskin argues that the precision of the programming language removes some of the 
potential need for ex post review, as the internal rules and in particular warranties and 
conditions can be formulated with much greater accuracy.138 However, while this may indeed 
remove linguistic ambiguity, the greater precision is of little help in relation to issues such as 
changing circumstances and questions of equity or good faith, as mentioned before.139 
Rather, these issues could be addressed by leaving certain parts of the agreement outside the 
blockchain record as a ‘non-smart’ and thus modifiable contract, whereas other parts might 
‘go smart’ and be self-executory and immutable, thereby building some flexibility into the 
relevant agreement.140 Alternatively, drafting could become more granular, in an attempt to 
address all potential future circumstances that may have an impact on the contractual 
duties—an approach which, of course, may come close to, but ultimately will never achieve, 
perfection. 
Third party effects and regulation at the intersection with private law 
The loss of control over the enforceability of rights is, in principle, acceptable in so far as the 
parties to a blockchain-based transaction and other users of that blockchain network are 
concerned. By adhering to the network, they have, implicitly or explicitly, agreed to operate 
in a technical, trustless environment, which only relies on maths and cryptography,141 and 
accepted that its internal rules may lead to outcomes different from those governed by 
private law rules.142 However, the effect on third parties outside the relevant blockchain 
network and on the market as a whole is more problematic.143  
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The starting point is the question of whether assets held in a blockchain financial 
network are inside or outside the estate of an insolvent, and hence are, or are not, available 
to the insolvent’s general creditors.144 In order to assess whether the relevant assets are 
legally attributed to the insolvent, the question arises as to whether the court should decide 
whether the insolvent has acquired or lost the asset on the basis of private law, or should 
apply the internal rules of the blockchain network as an expression of party autonomy, or as 
a form of lex mercatoria?145 Since the rights of the insolvent’s general creditors (who are 
unrelated third parties) are likewise at stake, the court will have to apply private law to the 
extent that the internal rules of the network diverge.  
However, what is in the interest of third parties may potentially frustrate those that 
have relied on the internal rules of the blockchain network. That uncertainty extends beyond 
outright acquisitions and dispositions to encompass scenarios where rules protect the 
insolvent estate against an outflow of assets, in particular, the pari passu principle or anti-
deprivation rule and their offshoots. Hence, parties may be surprised to find a court or 
insolvency official trying to ‘claw back’ blockchain-held assets transferred earlier in breach of 
these rules, or to claim damages.  
Ortolani argues that in similar contexts, enforcement outside the court system on the 
basis of autonomous rules can be an efficient way of settling divergences, citing the case of 
attribution of Internet addresses by ICANN.146 This practice may seem acceptable in respect 
of Internet addresses, however, financial assets, as opposed to Internet addresses, are 
constantly traded and encumbered, ie they may, until insolvency strikes, continuously enter 
and leave the estate. In other words, when it comes to financial assets there is a much greater 
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need to establish whether such earlier transactions occurred in breach of the pari passu or 
similar rules. 
Looking at the issue from the perspective of the solvent counterparty, other 
uncertainties become visible. Risk mitigation in financial markets is largely based on legal 
devices such as security, collateral, contractual termination, set-off and close-out netting, 
which generally feature in the parties’ contractual agreements. The effectiveness of risk 
mitigation depends on whether these contractual rights are enforceable as soon as the other 
party becomes insolvent. It is, however, unclear whether a court would regard these rights as 
enforceable where they arise from a smart contract recorded in a blockchain financial 
network. The fine balance established between contractual risk mitigation tools and 
mandatory insolvency law, as typically codified in so-called safe harbour rules, is very 
fragile.147 It has to reconcile contractual freedom with the interests of third parties and 
jurisdictions have typically adopted a strict line of policy in this respect. There is a significant 
danger that a court may consider this balance distorted if the strict mechanical execution of 
the stipulated contractual risk mitigation mechanisms in a blockchain financial network 
diverges, even if only slightly, from what is deemed acceptable generally. Contractual risk 
mitigation devices might be unenforceable as a consequence, derailing both parties’ risk 
management. 
This issue extends beyond private law into the sphere of financial regulation. 
Regulation attaches crucial importance to the enforceability of contractual risk mitigation, 
such as collateral, set-off and close-out netting. In particular, capital requirements are 
calculated on the basis of the net risk, ie the risk that remains after risk mitigation devices 
have been taken into account. Risk mitigation mechanisms can reduce a financial institution’s 
                                                
147 See Paech, n 96, 861-866; Bank for International Settlements, n 70, para 3.1.6. 
Draft working paper 16/12/2016 
41 
risk by up to 80 per cent.148 However, their risk-mitigating effect is only recognised under the 
Basel Accords and other regulatory texts to the extent that enforceability can be guaranteed 
ex ante—in practice, financial institutions have to prove enforceability by providing reliable 
legal opinions to that effect.149 Otherwise, risk and, accordingly, capital requirements must be 
calculated on a gross basis, which the financial sector cannot afford. As a consequence, not 
only may private-law-based risk mitigation tools fail when they are actually needed, ie in the 
event of insolvency, but the uncertainty regarding the enforceability of these tools may also 
unravel any risk-focused regulatory regime such as, in particular, capital requirements linking 
back to questions of systemic stability, as discussed earlier.150 
Connecting internal rules to private law 
In the light of the arguments discussed above, it is clear that the internal rules of blockchain 
networks used in financial markets need to be in harmony with the relevant private law. In 
order to achieve enforceability in legal terms of the acquisition and disposition of assets held 
in blockchain networks, de facto acquisition on the basis of the operation of software needs to 
be recognised by private law itself.  
This can be achieved by making the internal rules of a blockchain financial network 
the vehicle for private law. Private law would expressly recognise the outcome under the 
internal rules. To this end, a statutory rule is needed granting enforceability to the outcomes 
of the blockchain transaction process indirectly, on the basis of a statute. However, this legal 
effect can only be granted to networks on condition that the relevant internal rules of the 
network treat dispositions and acquisitions so as to be compatible with general principles of 
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private law. In particular, outcomes may not be arbitrary but instead must be based on 
objective criteria, such as chronology. Such rules do exist at the moment, notably in respect 
of the enforceability of acquisitions and dispositions as the outcomes of automated clearing 
processes for cash or securities, generally called ‘finality’. 151  These rules can serve as 
blueprints for legal provisions connecting the internal rules of blockchain financial networks 
to private law.152 
Secondly, and this is the more difficult part, accepting outcomes as enforceable generally 
means that there might still be exceptional circumstances that cast doubt on whether the 
execution can actually be backed by private law, even if the internal rules are generally 
deemed to be in line with the law. For instance, a software loophole or bug may produce a 
result that is incompatible with the principles underlying the network as enshrined in private 
law. The network itself may function correctly but the market environment may be derailed 
in the event of crisis. The complexity of the internal rules, in particular where smart contracts 
interact with one another on an autonomous basis, may blur the perception of potential 
outcomes.153 The fact that the enforceability of acquisitions is made dependent on the 
private law somehow suggests that there must be a way of undoing transactions and 
changing the blockchain, if only in exceptional circumstances. However, as mentioned 
before, this would be incompatible with the original logic of blockchain networks. 
5. DETERMINANTS FOR A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The preceding two chapters identified a number of open questions in areas where the 
character of blockchain financial networks presents specific challenges to financial regulation 
and private law. As discussed earlier, the concept of blockchain is still evolving and different 
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types of network will pose greater or smaller challenges in terms of governance, and some 
types may even be entirely unproblematic in this respect. 154 
However, legal and regulatory arrangements cannot be tailor-made for each 
blockchain network. Therefore, in the following, I will discuss two central issues that cut 
across the ‘material scope’ of regulation and private law discussed earlier, in particular the 
structure of blockchain financial networks and the importance of the cross-jurisdictional 
view. These two aspects are the main determinants for the effective design and 
implementation of a regulatory and legal framework capable of governing different types of 
network. 
Structure of the network 
The preceding two chapters have shown that blockchain financial networks need to be 
regulated on several counts, and that ultimately private law needs to apply within these 
networks. But how can regulation and private law be extended to blockchain financial 
networks in the most efficient manner? Disintermediation, leading to the abolition of 
accounts and intermediary-client relationships more generally will render traditional 
regulatory strategies largely inefficient and remove an important element to which private law 
rules traditionally attach. Instead, we must focus on what actually replaces the two-party 
relationship: a distributed network, built on poly-directional relationships among its nodes, 
which are linked solely through a software platform. Hence, regulation and law could target 
the software platform or the nodes, or both. 
Platform providers 155  for first-generation blockchain applications are generally 
informally organised groups of individuals. Today, Fintech start-ups, well-established 
financial institutions and infrastructures, and even central banks may venture into setting up 
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blockchain financial networks. There are a number of regulatory and legal aspects that can 
only be addressed for a blockchain financial network as a whole, regardless of how the circle 
of nodes is made up. The platform provider is the only suitable point of entry for network-
wide regulatory and legal rules. 156  Starting from basic requirements regarding safety, 
availability, integrity and continuity of service, any rules that can only be implemented 
centrally must be imposed on the platform provider. As a consequence, platform providers 
need to be legal persons (natural persons are too elusive) regulated by the State. There may 
still be state-remote, unregulated blockchain networks where the platform is provided under 
a more informal arrangement, such as for Bitcoin or Ethereum. However, it should be 
impossible to issue securities through these networks and they should not be dealing with 
legal tender. To achieve this goal, it is not necessary to close them down or block access to 
their websites. It is sufficient to prohibit regulated financial institutions from dealing with 
such networks.  
Platform providers have to ensure the soundness and continuity of the software 
platform. 157  Most importantly, this includes aligning the internal rules governing the 
acquisition of rights and the execution of contracts with private law.158 Turning the spotlight 
onto issues of systemic stability, the platform provider has to help prevent flash crashes and 
bubbles, not only by shaping the software accordingly but also by providing for relevant 
reporting mechanisms.159 Furthermore, in case of a permissioned network,160 the platform 
provider must administer admission to the network,161 ensuring non-discriminatory access to 
it162 and respecting relevant restrictions as to the circle of users or as to territorial reach.163  
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Whether the platform provider should be the addressee of all relevant regulatory or 
legal rules depends on who the nodes of the blockchain network are: if the circle of nodes 
consists exclusively of regulated financial institutions (which may act as intermediaries and 
therefore maintain account-based relationships with clients164), the regulatory burden can be 
shared between them and the platform provider. In this case, regulatory and legal rules that 
do not need to be implemented centrally are addressed to nodes.165 Generally, regulated 
financial entities will already be subject to relevant rules, such as an anti-money-laundering 
regime. However, relevant nodes must be authorised for the specific type of service provided 
by the network. For instance, if the network provides payment services, nodes authorised as 
banks will automatically be subject to all relevant regulation. Obversely, in a network 
administering securities, nodes authorised as payment services providers alone are not 
sufficiently regulated. 
Where the nodes of a given network are entities not regulated as financial 
institutions, or individuals, the situation is completely different. In this case, there are no 
intermediaries that could apply relevant regulation to their relationships with clients. The 
only entity capable of applying the relevant regulation to the network and its nodes is the 
platform provider itself. In that situation, the platform provider would need to be the 
addressee of the full range of relevant regulatory and legal rules, thereby becoming a fully 
regulated financial institution itself which does not,166 however, maintain accounts with its 
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nodes but controls the network through means of access control and programming of the 
network software. 
Thus, ‘structure’ as the first determinant refers to who the nodes of a network are 
and what services it provides. As a rule of thumb, the application of regulatory and private 
law rules to blockchain financial networks requires less adaptation of existing rules to the 
extent that such networks are homogeneous as regards their circle of nodes and the services 
provided. For example, a network specialising in payments that has as its nodes only 
authorised payment service providers or banks will not pose any great problem from the 
point of view of regulation and private law. By contrast, a network for clearing securities 
transfers against cash settlement that also offers collateral management and has both non-
financial corporations and regulated financial institutions as its nodes will be significantly 
more complicated to govern.  
Domestic and cross-jurisdictional reach of networks 
Financial markets are highly internationalised, whereas their governance is still largely defined 
on the basis of territorial criteria. States exert regulatory and supervisory authority over the 
activity of financial institutions on their territory, and the law governing dealings between 
market participants can only be chosen to some extent, being imposed on the basis of 
territorial considerations for a number of important issues. Therefore, the effective 
governance of blockchain financial networks requires a strategy explaining how the 
regulatory and legal solutions, which are limited in their territorial reach, can be applied to 
networks that are potentially spread across several countries. This paper has already shown 
that issues of regulation and private law are inextricably linked in some respects.167 This 
linkage is also an important element in overcoming the discrepancy in terms of the reach of a 
blockchain network and the means of governance. In particular, the enforceability of rights 
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must be made dependent on the effective regulation of the relevant blockchain network in its 
own jurisdiction. I will first look at the public law side of the issue before turning to private 
law questions. 
Cross-jurisdictional regulation and supervision 
Access to internet-based financial services is difficult to contain and control by local 
supervisors. They may be unable to regulate and supervise a service effectively because the 
platform provider and the nodes are not located in the same jurisdiction.168 Outright 
prohibitions are theoretically possible but difficult to justify—investors are ultimately free to 
risk their own money—and hold out scant promise of effective enforcement unless online 
access is blocked.169 Mechanisms to dis-incentivise the use of foreign blockchain financial 
services are probably more efficient—here, regulatory approval of certain blockchain 
financial networks can of itself be such an incentive. 
 Many blockchain financial networks will aim at an international, or even global, circle 
of users. However, being regulated in one jurisdiction does not generally satisfy regulators in 
other jurisdictions. The EU is in an exceptional position in that it has an effective common 
framework already in place: the EU ‘passport’ is linked to the authorisation and continued 
supervision of financial services providers in their home Member State and is in principle 
also good for providing the same service in other EU jurisdictions.170 A blockchain financial 
network, through its platform provider, could be a beneficiary of the passport, which argues 
very much in favour of having a platform provider authorised as a financial institution of the 
relevant type, eg as a payment service provider.171  
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Outside the EU, mutual recognition of authorisation and other supervisory decisions 
is close to anathema. As a fall-back option, a blockchain financial network could remain 
restricted to nodes within one jurisdiction, or seek authorisation in all jurisdictions relevant 
for its business. Alternatively, the market could be restricted to countries that do not require 
providers of the relevant service to be licensed (which would largely exclude the US and the 
EU, as they have regulatory regimes in place for just about every kind of financial service). 
Neither solution is conducive to innovation. However, at the moment, there seem to be no 
alternatives and blockchain financial networks will need to go through the motions of 
obtaining multiple authorisations. A set of international standards, which could borrow rules 
from texts developed for other types of market infrastructure,172 would serve regulatory 
convergence and thus facilitate the authorisation process for blockchain financial networks 
seeking to establish themselves in several jurisdictions.  
Obviously, this is a highly sensitive issue for London-based financial innovators 
should the UK leave the EU internal market as a consequence of the imminent termination 
of its EU membership. UK-based financial service providers will lose their passports and be 
treated as third country entities. They may decide to establish a locally incorporated and 
supervised subsidiary in a EU-27 State that would then allow them to benefit from an EU 
passport. Still, for UK entities, the process of authorisation would be facilitated as long as 
the relevant UK rules are in line with EU rules—however, this is an advantage that, after the 
loss of passporting privileges, would need to be formalised under a separate regime certifying 
equivalence of standards on a case-by-case basis.173    
                                                
172 See Bank for International Settlements, n 70. 
173 See European Commission, ‘Equivalence with EU Rules and Supervision’ at http://ec.europa.eu/ finance/general-
policy/global/equivalence/index_en.htm; ‘Equivalence Decisions taken by the European Commission’, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/global/equivalence-table_en.pdf; visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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Cross-jurisdictional co-ordination of private law 
The international framework supporting the enforceability of financial assets in foreign 
jurisdictions is rudimentary and non-binding.174  There is a binding, albeit fragmentary, 
private law framework covering this area in place in the EU, which despite some 
harmonisation of aspects of substantive law is built on a conflict-of-laws solution. This 
means that domestic laws continue to apply under a conflict-of-laws regime that co-ordinates 
their application.175 More ambitious international harmonisation of the legal framework for 
assets and contracts recorded in a blockchain network is unlikely to happen, particularly 
where the harmonisation of mandatory law is concerned.176 Rather, autonomous national 
laws, ideally coordinated by a set of global principles, key attributes or some other type of 
benchmark will retain their authority over such assets and contracts.  
Such a framework would involve three main threads, which I will address in turn 
below. In particular, it must be possible clearly to identify the law of which State is to apply to 
the assets held and smart contracts recorded in a blockchain financial network; the law so 
identified should determine the validity and enforceability of these assets and contracts also in 
foreign insolvency proceedings; and, for both of these, the jurisdiction of the applicable law 
must follow a number of standards regarding the legal and regulatory treatment of 
blockchain financial networks. 
                                                
174 Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary (‘Hague 
Securities Convention’), www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= conventions.text&cid=72; Unidroit Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities ('Geneva Securities Convention'); 
www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/ main.htm; UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured 
Transactions (2016), www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_on_ST_ebook.pdf. 
175 Settlement Finality Directive (n 137) Articles 8 and 9; Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral, 
Article 9; Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 
Articles 3, 8 and 17. 
176 Paech, Securities, Intermediation and Blockchain, n 23, 1. 
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Applicable law 
The enforceability of a right in a financial asset (full title, security, or collateral) or flowing 
from a contract (for instance, termination and set-off rights in the case of derivatives and 
repurchase agreements) depends on the law applicable to that concrete right. The 
identification of the applicable law crucially depends on the classification of the asset as one 
of different forms of property or claim. However, there is only rudimentary international 
compatibility as to this differentiation: non-corporeal securities electronically held in 
accounts are a case in point, as they are regarded in different jurisdictions as property, 
equitable interest or even as claims.177 Another example is the English law concept of choses 
in action, underlying the idea of registered shares, for which no corresponding concept exists 
in Civil law.178 By the same token, money in a bank account seems to be a form of property 
in England (because it can be traced to an onward acquirer), whereas it is regarded as a pure 
claim of the customer against the bank in many other jurisdictions.179 Some certainty exists in 
respect of derivatives, which are generally regarded as contracts and the corresponding rights 
pertaining thereto as claims,180 whereas there may be question marks to the extent that 
derivatives are standardised and fungible, thus starting to display attributes resembling 
securities. 
Cutting through this thicket merits a study of its own,181 but the point I wish to 
make here is that no international blockchain financial network can work if every jurisdiction 
                                                
177 See J.S. Rogers, ‘Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Art. 8’ (1995-96) 43 UCLA Law Review, 1449-59; L. Afrell 
and K. Wallin-Norman, ‘Direct or Indirect Holdings – A Nordic Perspective’ (2005) Uniform Law Review 10(2-3), 
277-284; F. Nizard, Les titres négociables (Economia et Banque Revue, Paris 2003), 245-252; J. Benjamin, Interests in 
Securities (Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-59. 
178 See J. Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2007), para 3.22. 
179 See T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, Value and Transactions’ (2016) Modern Law Review 79(3) (2016), 381, 384. 
180 Rome I Regulation, n 175, Article 3. 
181 Paech, Securities, Intermediation and Blockchain, n 23, 1-19. 
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involved were to classify the asset held in the network in accordance with its own 
idiosyncratic criteria. At present, international transfers of financial assets operate through 
accounts, ie they are two-party relationships, and a court would determine the nature of the 
right in question according to the law that applies to that specific account.182 However, in 
blockchain networks, there are no accounts,183 hence the question of which law applies to a 
right in an asset or flowing from a contract needs to be defined for the entire network en bloc.  
Following the lex rei sitae rule, the law applicable to assets and rights held in a 
blockchain network would be that of the location of the nodes. As this would lead to the 
application of different laws within the network, this approach is excluded. The alternative 
approach of lex societatis (in the case of shares) or lex contractus (in the case of bonds) may 
likewise result in the application of different laws within a network. Hence, the only suitable 
solution is to define that law for the network as a whole and to do so from the outset, either 
as a function of the jurisdiction that regulates the platform provider and hence the network, 
or on the basis of the initial choice of law made by the platform provider. That law would 
then flow into the design of the internal rules of the network, determining how assets are 
transferred and rights are executed. However, in order to avoid forum shopping, the choice 
of law should be restricted, in particular to jurisdictions where the platform provider is 
incorporated or has a major operation. 184  Following ‘Brexit’, networks in European 
jurisdictions will probably be unable to choose English law as the applicable law.185 
                                                
182 See Financial Collateral Directive, n 175, Article 9; Settlement Finality Directive, n 137, Article 9; Hague Securities 
Convention, n 174, Article 4. 
183 M. Kalderon, F. Snagg and C. Harrop, ‘Distributed ledgers: a future in financial services?’ (2016) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 31(5), 243, 247. 
184 See Hague Securities Convention (n 174) Article 4(1) 
185 See Settlement Finality Directive (n 137) Article 2(a) second indent. 
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Recognition under the lex fori concursus 
The acid test, however, is whether the relevant rights are also enforceable should one of the 
nodes become insolvent. In that case, enforceability is traditionally determined by the lex fori 
concursus, typically identified on the basis of a location-based connecting factor. As a result, 
the forum could be the jurisdiction of any of the nodes of a blockchain network.186 To achieve 
legal certainty as to the enforceability of the rights, it would be crucial for all these 
jurisdictions to consider enforceability on the basis of the law of the network, also in the 
event of insolvency of the relevant node.  
However, this is not a given. While the courts in insolvency proceedings will 
generally recognise the enforceability of earlier acquisitions and dispositions of the insolvent 
and of the contracts into which it has entered, even if these are governed by a foreign law, 
there are stark differences as to detail. In particular where courts feel that a specific 
arrangement impinges on the equal treatment of creditors (pari passu principle) as understood 
by their own law, they may regard the rules of their own jurisdiction as mandatory and any 
diverging effect under a different law as unenforceable.187 Whereas outright dispositions and 
acquisitions are typically not particularly ambiguous, and contractual rights to performance 
generally accepted, difficulties may arise where the parties arrange for security (such as a 
pledge, mortgage, or lien) in assets held in a blockchain network, where security or financial 
collateral is provided (including mechanisms such as margining, substitution and right of 
use), or where contractual termination rights, set-off or close-out netting are stipulated.188  
These issues are as a rule problematic in international settings, and much of the legal 
detail to be considered in the context of risk mitigation is owed to these jurisdictional 
                                                
186 See Bank for International Settlements, n 70, para 3.1.11. 
187 ibid; Paech, Close-out Netting, Insolvency Law and Conflict of Laws, (2014) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
14(2), 419, 431-432. See Rome I Regulation, n 175, Articles 8 and 17. 
188 See Paech, n 96, 861-867. 
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differences.189 The financial industry has learned to manage the legal risk involved, notably 
commissioning legal opinions covering all relevant scenarios to achieve an acceptable degree 
of ex ante legal certainty. However, in a scenario involving an international blockchain 
financial network, this approach will probably be less effective. At present, a party considers 
its risk in two-party relationships (with the counterparty, and with the intermediaries holding 
or transferring the relevant cash and securities, including collateral). If the relevant rights are 
enforceable in insolvency, the risk is considered acceptable. This ‘risk architecture’ will be 
changed where a blockchain financial network is involved. The enforceability of rights held 
in the network becomes the point of reference; however, each jurisdiction will develop its 
own conditions as to the enforceability of assets and contracts held in a blockchain network. 
In principle, the problem is not in any way structurally different from the legal uncertainties 
currently faced by the financial industry in cross-jurisdictional situations. However, it will 
remain unclear for quite some time which path legislators and courts will take, leading to 
uncertainty in the transition period. The financial industry will be unable to address the 
uncertainty arising from the shift towards assets and contracts recorded in international 
networks as long as the legal framework is unclear.  
The best solution in terms of supporting changes to statutory laws is to agree among 
jurisdictions that assets and contracts recorded in a blockchain financial network are 
enforceable also in insolvency, and that this is subject to the limitations set by the law 
governing the network, rather than by the limitations set by each lex fori concursus. Thus, 
nodes would not need to worry about the specificities of the insolvency laws in all 
jurisdictions where fellow nodes are located, but only about the limits imposed by the law 
that governs the network and its internal rules.  
                                                
189 See above, [000]. 
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Trading enforceability in return for a common regulatory standard 
This solution is, however, politically sensitive because the lex fori concursus would lose 
authority over the policy-laden aspect of creditor protection in insolvency. Contractual 
derogation from this core area of insolvency law is, as a rule, impossible.190 However, by 
accepting that the law that governs the network overrides the local insolvency law, nodes are 
somehow given the option, if not to derogate from insolvency law altogether, to choose the 
insolvency law of another country in respect of the assets held in the blockchain financial 
network. There are precedents in EU law,191 which could serve as a model.  
Yet the possibility of derogating from local insolvency law in favour of a foreign law 
would be highly significant, as it potentially concerns a large part or even all of an insolvent’s 
assets and contracts held in a blockchain network. Hence, it may not be possible to envisage 
such a shift unless all jurisdictions concerned agree on common standards for regulating 
blockchain financial networks. As shown in the preceding two chapters, risk-based regulation 
and private law enforceability are closely linked, so that such standards would also extend to 
the regulation of the internal rules of the network governing the acquisition and disposition 
of rights and the execution of contracts. Only if jurisdictions were to agree on such a 
common standard might the concession of a chosen insolvency law be acceptable from an 
insolvency policy point of view. Regulation and private law would thus result in a closed 
system on the international scale, as they typically do domestically. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial market activity conducted through blockchain networks poses risks very similar to 
those existing in the current, intermediary-based market: there are issues regarding resilience 
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and financial stability, market distortion and illegal activity. At the same time, a future 
blockchain environment will face private law questions similar to those the market faces 
now, in particular regarding the enforceability of rights in insolvency, which is a linchpin of 
risk mitigation and risk-related regulation. The governance rationale for blockchain-based 
financial market activity therefore largely corresponds to the axioms of the existing 
governance framework. Thus, blockchain financial networks need to be subject to a 
functionally equivalent regulatory and legal framework. 
The distributed record, capable of storing complex information such as auto-
executable financial transactions, will bring immense efficiency gains to financial markets. 
The facilitation of financial services brought about by this new type of database will reduce 
the operational burden and hence decrease reliance on intermediaries and infrastructures. At 
the same time, the use of distributed databases does not per se pose any insurmountable 
problems in terms of regulation or private law.  
However, other features of the original, Bitcoin-inspired, model of blockchain-based 
networks are unsuitable for use in financial markets from the point of view of effective 
governance. This is because existing regulatory strategies and legal concepts are largely 
ineffective if applied to applications that replicate the characteristics introduced by Bitcoin. 
First, many highly complex regulatory and legal functions in the market are at present taken 
care of on a small scale, fundamentally in two-party relationships. That intermediary-client 
approach, one of the cornerstones of regulation, is certainly inefficient to some degree, and a 
distributed, all-encompassing database may be more efficient and less costly. However, it 
would seem that some complex governance questions can actually be better referred to a 
bilateral relationship, as financial services will always remain connected to individual 
circumstances: for example, anti-money-laundering compliance is necessarily an individual 
process. Furthermore, the private law that applies to individual clients will generally be a 
local law, no matter what law applies within the networks through which transactions are 
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administered. Hence, some forms of two-party relationship and, therefore, a certain layer of 
intermediation, will persist even if the market moved to a blockchain-based setup. 
Secondly, there is no ex post judgment within Bitcoin-like networks regarding the 
enforceability of rights arising in these networks. This would make financial networks 
ungovernable from a societal perspective. It is true that unstoppable, irreversible self-
execution provides more certainty and lowers cost; however, it also entails a total loss of 
elasticity of behaviour. Elasticity can have its positive sides and is always coupled with 
institutional and personal responsibility; therefore certainty of execution is not an absolute 
argument. More importantly, an environment consisting of self-executing contracts and 
irreversible, computer-induced transactions lacks the element of legal and moral 
responsibility, which is a fundamental building block of our social order, depriving society 
from one of its means to implement its policy goals, including insolvency distribution and 
other rules that protect the interests of third parties and the market as a whole. 
In other words, elasticity in decision-making and the existence of ex post judgment 
are the necessary flipside of a system that is to some degree uncertain and inefficient, such as 
that currently in place. A perfect system could do without judgment, elasticity and 
responsibility and rely instead on strict, self-enforcing, immutable rules. However, a perfect 
system would consist, first, of a one hundred per cent fail-safe blockchain network (which 
cannot exist), which, secondly, administered the assets of all parties so that there would no 
third parties left to be adversely affected. Otherwise, the risk of failure is merely shifted to 
non-adjusting parties which are those not using the blockchain network, a group which 
experience shows may consist mainly of non-financial creditors and society as a whole. Some 
may support a development in that direction and see such an all-encompassing blockchain-
based ‘world computer’ as the necessary complement to the Internet of Things and the 
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algorithmic enhancement of our life experiences. 192  However, such a leviathan is 
conceptually impossible, as there will always be interests outside the network that general 
laws and social norms need to protect, quite apart from the consideration that it would by no 
means be a desirable development. 
The good news is that the financial industry does not plan to dispose of these 
elements entirely. There is a general understanding that blockchain-based financial networks 
should operate within the reach of law, courts and supervisors. So far, however, the potential 
negative externalities of increased certainty inside the network on the world outside have not 
been sufficiently acknowledged. Yet such recognition is the prerequisite for the regulatory 
and legal integration of blockchain-based financial services. It mainly entails setting 
boundaries on the blockchain characteristics of immutability and unstoppable execution. 
As a result, the expected blockchain revolution will primarily be a technological one, 
introducing new ways of transaction processing, recording and reporting that will render the 
financial market significantly more efficient. As far as the governance of blockchain networks 
is concerned, the current strategies will remain largely the same. Accordingly, state-remote 
networks, ie networks similar to Bitcoin or Ethereum, cannot serve as models for blockchain 
financial networks. By contrast, governments would be well advised to cooperate in creating 
a supportive governance framework for regulated networks to ensure that blockchain 
technology can be used for the benefit of the market as a whole.   
 
                                                
192 See Ethereum, ‘Ethereum: The World Computer’ (video), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j23HnORQXvs, 
visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
